UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

MARY SEGUIN, pro se

Plaintiff,

VS. Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS

U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Appeal No. 23-1967

Related Appeal No. 23-1851 Related Appeal No. 24-1451

RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, et al. *Defendants-Appellees*

Defendants

THIRD RULE 62.1 INDICATIVE MOTION ON PLAINTIFF'S RULE 60(b)(6) MOTION ON MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a)

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

STATE-SPONSORED ORGANIZED FRAUD, THEFT OF PUBLIC MONEY AND GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS INVOLVING BILLIONS OF DOLLARS

Unlawful Interstate Collection of Unlawful 12% Compound Interest Within the Title IV-D Legal Framework Involving Organized Felonious Obstruction of Justice Acts by Defendants, Obstruction of Justice and Misprision of Felony by Defendant Counsels

Aided and Abetted By William Smith's and Marissa Pizana's

USURPATION BY THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DURING THE PENDANCY OF TWO APPEALS THROUGH CONDUCTING 9 MONTH-LONG *VOID AB INITIO* DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS IN 23-cv-126 THROUGH SMITH'S POST-APPEAL ALTERATION OF THE DOCKET RECORD FOR THE DATE OF FILING OF

APPEAL TO FALSELY MAKE IT LOOK LIKE THERE WERE PENDING APPEALS AT THE TIME OF FILING OF APPEAL

I. UNDISPUTED FACTS

Before the Court is Plaintiff's Rule 62.1 Indicative Motion filed on September 6, 2024 (ECF 64). Additionally, before the Court is Plaintiff's Second Rule 62.1 Indicative Motion (ECF 65) to Supplement Bivens Claims. Moreover, on September 13, 2024, Plaintiff-Appellant filed Appellant's Opening Brief in Appeal No. 23-1967 that arises from the above-captioned district court case. Plaintiff, MARY SEGUIN, hereby incorporates all factual allegations and arguments alleged therein (in ECF 64, ECF 65 and 23-1967 Opening Brief) as fully alleged herein, and hereby moves under Rule 62.1 for an Indicative Ruling on Plaintiff's Rule Venue, to the United States District Court for the District of Southern Texas, where within the legal framework of Title IV-D, Defendants purposefully reaches Texas and operates their unlawful 12% compound interest debt collection and internet web-based digital constitutionally infirm juryless debt collection forums for nonwelfare Defendant Gero Meyersiek's *private* debts targeting alleged support debt under federal legal framework of Title IV-D, including entering into agreement with Texas Plaintiff waiving interest, but then place false liens on Texas properties for Rhode Island's unlawful 12% compound interest put back on Rhode Island's State Registry within the Title IV-D legal framework under color of federal law.

Incorporated therein (ECF 64, 65) and explicit to this motion is the undisputed fact of structural defect explicit in the blatant usurpation of the functus officio district court (in the District for Rhode Island) of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals during the pendency of two appeals (23-1967, 23-1978) conducting concurrent functus officio void ab initio district court proceedings through the criminal obstruction alteration post-appeal of the docket record in this matter redocketing pre-appeal filed motions on the date of filing of the notice of appeal (ECF 32, 32-1, 33, 33-1) to falsely make it look like there were pending motions at the time of the filing of the notice of appeal, which corrupt functus officio void ab initio proceeding has lasted for nine months and is on-going (void orders never withdrawn nor rescinded). Any Functus Officio act by definition is unofficial act by federal officers of the Office of the U.S. Court in the district of Rhode Island, and is explicit proof of the corruption of federal law under color of federal law.

This demonstration of usurpation of the rule of law and the corruption of law prove the explicit flippant flouting of the rule of law and demonstrates federal officers and state officers in Rhode Island's adoption of government bureaucracy abuse of the People and waste of public funds¹, but further cements the fact that

¹ See, e.g., Yates v. U.S., 574 U.S. 528 (2015), with note as to no prosecution against the "shredding party" of documents used against the Yates by the DOJ – see, Gorsuch, Neil and Nitze, Janie (2024), Over Ruled, the Human Toll of Too Much Law, Harpers Prentice Publishers; see also, BADGER INSTITUTE, FEDERAL GRANT\$TANDING 4, 16 (2018); see also, Where States Get Their Money: FY 2021, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Mar. 21, 2023),

state and federal officers in Rhode Island think officers in Rhode Island are above the law. Under the Anglo-American juris prudentia, no Sovereign is above the law. No person is above the law. No agency/office is above the law. This functus officio federal Court is structurally defective. Plaintiff has additional independent Bivens Claims. Plaintiff additionally has independent claims and independent causes of action under 5 U.S.C. § 706 impugning the validity and the legitimacy of Title IV-D administrative procedures that the 2024 evidence proves systemically alters and falsifies the interest portion of the federal Central Registry "zeroing out" interest, falsely certifying blatant criminal obstruction as "federally compliant," (which "zeroed out interest" are then put back on the Rhode Island State registry under Title IV-D for the purpose of making false debt claims for 12% compound interest targeting individual support obligors that impact a significant majority of the United States Population), then award billions of federal public funds to continue the RICO debt collection operations making false debt claims in fraud against the People, all under the federal legal framework of an overly complicated, administratively costly, replete with federal public funds "reward" schematics built to incentivize unconstitutional juryless actions in debt at common law brought in

https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/data-visualizations/2023/where-states-gettheir-money-fy-2021; see also, Historical Tables Table 12.2, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/htables/ (last visited August 30, 2024).

now proven <u>bad faith</u> by the government, falsely labeled as "social security." *See*, 42 U.S.C. § 651-669.

What happens when functus officio officers of the court who took Oaths of judicial Offices "judges" seek to corruptly create judge-created laws under color of federal law for the purpose of corrupting the rule of law? In this matter, the functus officio federal judiciary in the District of Rhode Island is complicit in a corrupt furtherance of the scheme, with functus officio William Smith leading the charge to conduct functus officio void ab initio district court "unofficial" proceedings for nine long months running concurrent to the pendency of two appeals appealing his conducting obstruction of justice void ab initio proceedings, from November 20, 2023 to the present, with the last functus officio void ab initio order issued in March 2024 (thus far none withdrawn nor rescinded in order perpetuate infinitely the corruption of federal law under color of functus officio void ab initio federal law), that are aided and abetted by Defendant counsel Pizana, a Rhode Island Special Attorney General public officer herself, during the pendency of two appeals, 23-1967 and 23-1978. Additionally, Plaintiff has independent causes of action against William E. Smith and Pizana, and John Doe and Jane Doe of the federal judiciary and John Doe and Jane Doe within the district of Rhode Island acting in a federal capacity, which the usurpation and corruption of law inherent in the underlying foundational structural defect

demonstrated by this *functus officio* Court during the pendency of two appeals that is on-going make clear this Rhode Island district court venue <u>lacks the requisite</u> <u>structural impartiality</u> to further the fair administration of justice.

Incorporated and inherent in Plaintiff's prior Rule 62.1 Motion is the requirement for the Motion to be heard in another impartial venue outside of the district of Rhode Island, because Plaintiff has independent claims against *functus* officio officers and persons and the *functus officio* Office of the U.S. Courts of the district court in the district of Rhode Island.

Plaintiff hereby explicitly moves on the record that Plaintiff's Rule 62.1 Motions for Indicative Ruling (ECF 64) and (ECF 65) must be transferred and heard in another impartial venue, in the interest of the fair administration of justice, under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a).

As stated by James Madison, "No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, *corrupt his integrity*." The Federalist No. 10, at 59 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). The integrity of the Court has been corrupted by the *Functus Officio* William E. Smith and the *functus officio* district court clerks, and the *functus officio* district court that are exposed to obstruction liability, and Plaintiff has viable claims. This matter is required to be transferred to another neutral impartial venue. *See*, 28 U.S.C. §

1404 (a). As 28 U.S.C. §455(a) is self-executing, Smith and the judges in this district court are moreover required under the law to recuse. See, In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 220 (1st Cir. 1991). The chief judge of this court's inaction and failure to enjoin unofficial acts by a functus officio William E. Smith usurping the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, and who is under his administrative supervision, is similarly exposed to usurpation liability. The functus officio William E. Smith who post-appeal criminally altered the docket record in this matter in order to falsely make it look like there were pending motions at the time of appeal (ECF 32, 32-1, 33, 33-1) for the purposeful criminal usurpation of jurisdiction from the Court of Appeals, then subsequently held a prolonged and protracted functus officio proceeding in the district court under color of federal law during the *pendency of two appeals* 23-1967 and 23-178 for the explicit purpose of interfering with the pending appeals ultimately to conceal his former clients' systemic criminal federal record falsifications, demonstrates he thinks he is above the law.

Within the legal framework of Title IV-D, Rhode Island, aided by the *functus* officio William Smith and other federal and state agents acting in a federal capacity corruptly dispatch the state's legal machinery to <u>rob the People</u> through false debt claims for unlawful 12% compound interest under color of federal law, under the

false promise of a "social security" RICO false debt collection scheme that is now proven to be nothing more than a corruption of the State's legal machinery.

Plaintiff makes clear that Plaintiff's independent APA claims and causes of action, as well as Bivens claims and causes of action thereupon the discovery of egregious injury to the Plaintiff by the administrative state robbing the People and robbing the Plaintiff within the legal framework of Title IV-D in 2024, is viable, and Plaintiff seeks to reopen the judgment under Rule 60(b) to move for transfer to the requisite impartial venue of Southern District of Texas under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1404(a).

A. The Sovereign is Not Above the Law – King Charles I and the Glorious Revolution

Under Article III's recognition of the law, the Court must apply to the facts and evidence an Originalism review of the Sovereign status in the Anglo-American legal jurisprudence on the legal relationship between the Sovereign and the People. The Forebearers and Founders of Massachusetts and Rhode Island (established through the grant of Royal Charter from Charles II) hail from Puritan settlers from England, where in 1649 the trial and execution of King Charles I set the defining foundation for Constitutional liberty as we know it and the constitutional legal jurisprudence underpinning the American Revolution. "The vivid events of the trial and execution which followed, meant that no absolute monarch could again

successfully claim the autocratic powers which King Charles I had enjoyed. These facts had profound consequences far from Whitehall where the King went to his death. In a sense they resound even today throughout the world. They underlie the rights of the people which give ultimate legitimacy to the constitutional arrangements in countries still unknown when the King faced his end." See, e.g., The Hon Justice Michael Kirby AC CMG, Anglo-Australian Lawyers Association, London-Great Hall, Grays Inn, January 22, 1999 on the 350th anniversary of the execution of King Charles. (Justice of the High Court of Australia. Formerly President of the International Commission of Jurists) http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/kirbyj/kirbyj charle88.htm. "Without the trial of the King, it is inconceivable that the Glorious Revolution of 1688 would have taken place. Yet it is that revolution which finally established the system of limited or constitutional monarchy as a conditional and generally symbolic form of government, always ultimately answerable to the will of the people. Without the Glorious Revolution, there would probably have been no American Revolution in 1776." *Id*.

The 1649 Sovereign, King Charles I, was charged and sentenced for "breach of the contract" made between the King and his people, and Oath the King took to protect the People. In the words of the High Court of Justice President Bradshaw's Statement to Charles at the Conclusion of the Trial, 'there is a contract and a

bargain made between the King and his people, and your oath is taken: and certainly, Sir, the bond is reciprocal; for as you are the liege lord, so they liege subjects ... *This we know now, the one tie, the one bond, is the bond of protection that is due from the sovereign; the other is the bond of subjection that is due from the subject.* Sir, if this bond be once broken, farewell sovereignty! ... These things may not be denied Sir. Whether you have been, as by your office you ought to be, a protector of England, or the destroyer of England, let all England judge, or all the world, that hath look'd upon it." *Id.*; *See*, Parliamentary Archives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

(https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-

heritage/evolutionofparliament/parliamentaryauthority/civilwar/collections/trialcha rlesi/); see also, M. Bond (ed), The Manuscripts of the House of Lords, vol. 11

Addenda 1514–1714. The contract appealed to in 1649 is the "original contract" that in modern day is referred as "the social contract."

Similar to the Rump Parliament that charged and sentenced to death the Sovereign Charles I for treasonous breach his oath of his and his Office's contract with the People of England, the legal history of the American Revolution illustrates just how important law was to the revolutionaries and, relatedly, how *crucial legal justifications for their actions* were to *them*. "What counts as law?" In the American jurisprudence, *Citizens* as well as officials would have to accept the

"recognition of law," lest the officials would be nothing more than 'the gunman writ large' vis-a-vis the citizens." See, Larry Alexander, Constitutional Theories: A Taxonomy and (Implicit) Critique, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 623,642 (2014); see also, James Allan, The Vantage Of Law: Its Role in Thinking About Law, Judging and Bills of Rights (2011). This functus officio Court needs to look no further than the constitution of Rhode Island for evidence of "recognition of law" enshrining the legitimacy of the government contingent on officers' performance on the contract with the People under Oath and recognition of law contingent on their actions answerable to the will of the People: Article II, Section 3 Oath of general officers "All general officers shall take the following engagement before they act in their respective offices, to wit "You being by the free vote of the electors of this state of Rhode Island, elected unto the place of do solemnly swear to be true and faithful unto this state, and to support the Constitution of this state and of the United States; that you will faithfully and impartially discharge all the duties of your aforesaid office to the best of your abilities, according to law. This affirmation you make and give upon the peril of the penalty of perjury." Section 7 "The People of the State of Rhode Island believe that public officials and employees must adhere to the highest standards of ethical conduct, respect the public trust and the rights of all persons, be open, accountable and responsive, avoid the appearance of impropriety and not use their position for private gain or

advantage. Such persons shall hold their positions during good behavior." Plainly, officers under the Oath of their Offices are "answerable to the will of the people" as defined in the Trial of Charles I long ago in 1649 that is enshrined in Rhode Island's constitution and the United States Constitution (10th Amendment). Accordingly, in 1948 Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act to precisely check the administrative state's power. The Supreme Court has time and again clarified that the States accept federal regulation under the Commerce Clause, making it clear that the States act under federal authority in a federal capacity when they act as agents in a federal capacity, of which capacity Rhode Island abused, when it alters and falsifies the interest portion of the federal records in the federal Central Registry under the Title IV-D legal framework under color of federal law, for the singular purpose of concealing its unlawful 12% compound interest that it then puts back on its State registry under the Title IV-D legal framework, with which Rhode Island makes false interest debt claims against support debt obligors, the People, in juryless and structurally rigged constitutionally infirm forums, robbing the People under color of federal Title IV-D law.

Under the law, this *functus officio* Court must acknowledge and submit to the *seismic* revolution in law restoring APA back to the 1948 Congressional "Originalism" that only just occurred on June 28, 2024 and again on July 1, 2024

with the overturn of the *Chevron* Doctrine that previously rubber stamped corrupt agencies' corrupt interpretation of what is undeniable obstruction of justice Title IV-D administrative procedures under color of federal law that Rhode Island (with aid from William Smith) criminally withheld, which evidence was discovered by Plaintiff in 2024, that is properly before this Court. See, Loper Bright Enterprise v. Raimondo (slip opinion) (2024). See also, Corner Post v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, (slip opinion) (2024). See also, Neil Gorsuch and Janie Nitze (2024), Over Ruled: The Human Toll of Too Much Law, HarpersPrentice Publishing. In other words, a clear pathway to relief obstructed by *Chevron* in September 2023 was not available then, and Rhode Island's criminally withheld evidence of unlawful Title IV-D procedures was purposed to conceal injury from Plaintiff and to thwart the discovery of injury, and to obstruct entitled relief. In fact, under the *Chevron Deference* Doctrine before June 28, 2024, criminal withholding or obstruction of documentary evidence by agencies within the purported Social Security legal framework is nothing new, be it in benefits denial under Social Security Disability or the present concealed criminal collection of false debts within the Title IV-D legal framework (another "social security scheme") under color of federal law RICO scheme – as explained by Justice Gorsuch in his August 6, 2024 book Over Ruled: The Human Toll of Too Much Law, under the former broadly agency-abused Chevron deference, "your claim is

dismissed based on the strength of what more or less amounts to **secret evidence**." See, Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1158-159, 1162-63 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (when Mr. Biestek's case eventually reached the Supreme Court, Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Gorsuch dissented.) It does not end there; for example, after the OIG performed a forensic investigation of the Yates case and found extensive criminal obstruction shredding of evidence by the Administrative State Government during the investigation, grossly violating criminal Sarbanes-Oxley under which Yates was prosecuted for sizes of fish, no prosecution on government officials shredding evidence was ever undertaken. That is easily fact checked. See, National Oceanographic and Atmospheric administration, Review of NOAA Fisheries Enforcement Programs and Operations 1, 3, Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Commerce (Jan. 2010), https://www.oig.doc.gov/OIGPublications/19887.pdf. See also, Memorandum from Todd J. Zinser to Dr. Jane Lubschnco, Re: OIG Investigation #PPC-SP-10-0260-P, re: Destruction of OLE Documents During an Ongoing OIG Review (Apr. 2, 2010); Allison Winter, Lawmakers Want NOAA's Law Enforcement Chief to Quit in Wake of Scandal, N.Y. Times (Mar. 4, 2010), https://archive,nytimes.com/www.nytimes,lawmakers-want-noaas-law-

enforcement-chief-to-61023.html. In other words, Defendants and their RICO aider *functus officio* William Smith, betray in their public positions before this

proceeding that they rely on the administrative state's record of doing nothing to check systemic law violations by federal and state officials alike. For example, counsel for State Defendants' filings in this proceeding consistently remain vacuous on substance and facts responding to Plaintiff's challenge on the fundamental legitimacy of Defendants' falsification of the interest portion of federal Title IV-D Central Registry, but instead feebly mischaracterize Plaintiff's detail of the Originalism of Anglo-American jurisprudence on Defendants', Pizana's, Neronha's, and Smith's obstruction of justice mispriscio clerici as "incoherent and rambling" that simply *cement* the bureaucracy's abuse and waste, and a tyrant's position that it is above the law and not answerable to the People, much like King George III. Defendants, Pizana and Smith are wrong – as the Founders saw it, the people have a right to make the rules governing their lives through their elected representatives. Any system of lawmaking that neglects this right would invite contempt for the law itself – see, The Federalist No. 62 (probably James Madison), in The Federalist Papers 382 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). *Chevron* was corruptly abused to shut down access to remedy availed to injured People under the guise of agency "expertise" whose one true expertise is shown in cases like here, and in Yates, and in Biestek, is the corruption of law.

Defendants' or Pizana's "say so" is no longer afforded "great weight" under the present recognition of law post *Chevron*. Article III has restored independent

judicial review of officials' and unelected bureaucrats-created administrative procedures, and the criminal withholding in multiple state and federal official proceedings of blatant criminal Title IV-D procedures involving obstruction record alteration and falsification of unlawful interest debt federal records in a nationwide RICO debt collection scheme is subject to independent judicial review under 5 U.S.C. § 706, with no "great weight" afforded to Defendants' nor Pizana's false claims before the Court that these criminal procedures serve a legitimate State interest – Pizana's usurpation of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals during the pendency of two appeals (23-1967 and 23-1978) and Pizana's false claims before official federal proceedings falsely alleging legitimate Sovereign interest brings us back to the corollary all important issue of Sovereign legitimacy that the injured Texas Plaintiff has a cause and claim to impugn Sovereign validity that *directly* robs the People through false claims for debt under the guise of "social security" through *criminal* obstruction of justice **secret** administrative procedures that are labeled "confidential" or "secret evidence," traces of which could already be seen in Mr. Biestek's case. Pizana's refusal to answer to the substance of Plaintiff's civil claim "charges" of corruption is no different from King Charles I's tactic refusing to answer to the charges of waging war against his own people in 1649.

In 1649, the resulting regicide was of the person of Charles I – today, commences the trial of criminal obstruction Title IV-D procedures and complicit

officers under color of federal law that far exceeds the scale of the document shredding in the Yates' case – this is systemic robbing of the People under a costly federal legal framework under the blatant lie of "social security" for *several decades*, against which relief was thwarted by judicially-created doctrines deferring to the administrative state such as *Chevron*.

The overturn of *Chevron* is the most democratic restoration of power to the People in American democracy thanks to Article III, and *Corner Post* is the most democratic restoration of access to relief under cherished Anglo-American jurisprudence, thanks to Article III, to the Injured People who are systemically injured by *gross* abuse of power of the Administrative State Behemoth. Plaintiff exemplifies Exhibit I of the Human Toll of Too Much *Corruption of* Law by the likes of the Defendants, Pizana and William Smith.

With pending Rule 62.1 Motions (ECF 64, 65) on Rule 60(b) and Rule 15(a)(2) and 15(d) motions to add and supplement APA Claims, Bivens Claims and add defendants, including William E. Smith, the Office of U.S. Courts in the District for Rhode Island, requisite impartiality necessitates the transfer of venue to the impartial venue of the District for Southern Texas, where a significant portion of the Defendants' criminal fraudulent debt collection scheme purposefully reaches or occurred (fraudulent liens, fraudulent certifications from 2018 to the present false statements there is no interest within the Title IV-D legal framework, wire fraud,

mail fraud, etc.), and contract agreement occurred. The Fourteenth Amendment, the Due Process Clause requires transfer of venue to the Southern District of Texas.

II. CONCLUSION

Usurpation lasting 9 months and is on-going by this functus officio district court in the district of Rhode Island of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals during the pendency of two appeals 23-1967 and 23-1978 necessitates transfer of venue in the furtherance of the fair administration of justice – this is moreover inherent in Plaintiff's Rule 62.1 Motions (ECF 64, 65). Plaintiff is entitled to Rule 62.1 Indicative Ruling to Grant Plaintiff's Rule 60(b) motions and Rule 15(a)(2) and Rule 15(d) motions (ECF 64, 65) to amend the complaint and to supplement the complaint to add additional APA claims and add additional defendants, as well as add additional Bivens claims and add additional defendants, including William E. Smith and the Office of the U.S. Courts in the District of Rhode Island for usurpation of jurisdiction through obstruction. Plaintiff has independent claims. It is in the interest of judicial economy to vacate Younger Abstention dismissal under Rule 60(b) and amend under Rule 15(a)(2) and supplement under Rule 15(d), rather than Plaintiff filing independent APA claims and Bivens claims in separate actions. The functus Officio district court lacks jurisdiction to defer independent claims for remedy and relief from Sovereign administrative state officers' criminal

abuse and breach of Oath/contract, and whose clear position is their corrupt Sovereign actions are not answerable to the will of the People. Anglo-American jurisprudence amply makes clear such a breach results in "farewell sovereignty" upon which jurisprudence the American Revolution relies legally. Pizana's mischaracterization of Anglo-American jurisprudence underpinning the Constitution as "incoherent" and "rambling" shows unfitness and requires sanctions for defiant refusal to uphold the Constitution before this official proceeding. This Court must be allowed to discover who (state and federal) and what actually caused to and to what extent, and how falsified Title IV-D records have been transmitted to the federal Central Registry, based on which how much federal public funds has been knowingly falsely claimed to the United States under the Title IV-D legal framework to operate the RICO scheme to defraud support obligors, and defraud the Plaintiff. This matter requires a change of venue to the Southern District of Texas. Oral Argument is Requested.

Respectfully submitted,

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Dated: September 23, 2024

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that the foregoing motion has been filed on September 23, 2024 electronically transmitted to the Clerk of the Court who serves via the Court's ECF filing system, on all registered counsel of record.

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EXHIBIT I.

SPECIFICATION FOR OCSS CHANGE ORDER Auto Adjustment of Interstate Interest

This specification will outline the process by which interstate cases are selected; automatic adjustments are created, and support orders are modified all for the purpose of removing interest from interstate cases.

FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

It is desirable for the Rhode Island Office of Child Support Services (OCSS) to prohibit the charging of interest on interstate cases. This is manually done by placing an N in the interest field on page 2 of the support order. Entry of the N not only prohibits the charging of future interest but automatically creates adjustments to zero out any existing interest.

There currently exists on the linthodes system interstate cases for which the interest field is not an N and for which there is interest due. It is these cases that the system will process.

If on an interstate case, the interest field on the support order is blank, the system will automatically place an N in the interest field and create non-each adjustments to zero out any existing interest. No support order modification or interest adjustments will be done on interstate cases without a support order or for which the interest field is already an N or is a Y, B or P.

Two reports will be created. The first will detail the interstate cases for which a support order modification was done and for which one or more interest adjustments were created. The second report will detail interstate cases for which the interest field is Y, B or P. A Y in the interest field is an order to accrue interest while B and P are orders to stay future interest but to keep any interest that has accrued to date.

January 25, 2011
NACSE Specification (OOS Interest Adjust OOS Interest doc